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Sloman: Unreasonable Use of Force

NOTE
THROW A DOG A SUSPECT:
WHEN USING POLICE DOGS
BECOMES AN UNREASONABLE
USE OF FORCE UNDER THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
INTRODUCTION

A felony suspect, hiding in the woods outside his parents'
rural home in Washington State suddenly finds himself in the
clutches of a police dog with a biting force of 800 to 1200
pounds per square inch, comparable to a car running over a
body part.l As the suspect screams in agony, police anxiously
make their way through the dark, unfamiliar woods to find
him.2 Although this police dog ordinarily bites a suspect for no
more than four seconds, in this instance, the dog continued to
bite for forty-five to sixty seconds, until police finally located
the suspect. 3 Because of this attack, the suspect suffered extensive and permanent injuries to his upper arm.4
While the Ninth Circuit has generally held that using
properly trained police dogs does not constitute deadly or excessive force, the court reexamined the issues in Miller v. Clark
County.5 Specifically, the court addressed whether a dog bite

1 Miller v. Clark County, 340 F.3d 959, 960-962 (9th Cir. 2003).
21d. at 961.
31d.
41d.
51d. at 960, 962-963 (citing Brewer v. City of Napa, 210 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th
Cir. 2000».
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continuing for close to a minute was excessive or deadly force. 6
The court held that despite the extremely long duration of the
dog bite and the extensive injuries Miller suffered as a result,
the bite was neither deadly nor excessive force. 7
This Note contends that a dog bite lasting up to a minute
is excessive force under these circumstances and violated
Miller's Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures. Part I of this Note provides a general synthesis of current Fourth Amendment seizure law as it applies to using police dogs. s Part II discusses the facts of Miller and the court's
application of current case law to those facts. 9 Finally, Part III
argues that the court failed to properly apply existing Fourth
Amendment seizure law to the facts in Miller, and therefore,
the force used was unreasonable. 10

I.

BACKGROUND

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures."ll A person is "seized" for Fourth
Amendment purposes when arrested by a police officerP Thus,
when a police officer arrests a suspect, the Fourth Amendment
prohibits using unreasonable force to make the arrest. IS This,
however, does not mean the officer can use no force, but rather
the force used must be reasonable under the circumstances. 14
Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court has developed a
reasonableness standard for deadly force, and another less rigorous reasonableness standard for all other force used by police
officers. 15 Therefore, in the police dog context, courts must first
assess whether using a dog is deadly force and if not deadly,

[d.
7 [d. at 963.
8 See infra notes 11 to 132 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 133 to 184 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 185 to 228 and accompanying text.
11 U.S. Canst. amend. IV.
12 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
13 [d.
14 [d. at 396.
15 Miller, 340 F.3d at 962 n.3.
6
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courts next examine whether the force was excessive under the
less rigorous standard. I6

A

TENNESSEE V. GARNER: WHEN USING DEADLY FORCE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE

Is

In Tennessee v. Garner, the United States Supreme Court
held that it is unreasonable, and thus unconstitutional under
the Fourth Amendment, for an officer to use deadly force to
stop a fleeing suspect unless the officer has probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a "significant threat of death or
serious physical injury to the officers or others."17 In Garner, a
Memphis police officer shot a felony suspect in the back of the
head as he fled from the scene of a burglary. 18 At the time of
the shooting, the officer stated that he was "reasonably sure"
that Gamer did not have a weapon. I9
Gamer's father sought damages against the officer under
42 U.S.C. section 1983, claiming the shooting violated his son's
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures. 2o The
officer, in tum, relied on a Tennessee statute that provided, "If,
after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either
flee or forcibly resist, the officer may use all the necessary
means to affect [sic] the arrest. "21 After the initial trial and
appeal, the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Tennessee found in favor of the officer.22 On subsequent appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and
remanded, holding the statute unconstitutional,23 The State of
Tennessee appealed the decision. 24
The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed, holding
the Tennessee statute unconstitutional because it authorized
16Id.
17

Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1,3 (1985) (internal quotes omitted).

IBId. at 4.
19 Id. at 3 (internal quotes omitted).
20 Id. at 5.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that "every person who under color of any

statute, ordinance, regulation ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Thus, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 allows an individual to recover damages for injuries allegedly caused by
a police officer. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 388.
21 Garner, 471 U.S. at 4.
22Id. at 6.
23Id.
24 Id. at 7.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004

3

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 8

194

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34

the unreasonable use of force against a suspect who posed "no
immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others.''25 To
determine the reasonableness of a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment, the Court held it is necessary to "balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interest alleged to justify the intrusion. "26 In applying
this balancing test to the force used against Garner, the Court
concluded that using deadly force to prevent his escape was
unreasonable. 27 The Tennessee statute was thus unconstitutional because it permitted using deadly force against all fleeing suspects, without regard to whether the force was reasonable under the circumstances. 28 Therefore, because Garner
presented no immediate threat to the officers, using deadly
force to prevent his escape was unreasonable, and thus unconstitutionaU9 However, the Court went on to hold that, "Where
an officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape by
using deadly force."30
B.

GRAHAM V. CONNOR: AsSESSING THE REASONABLENESS OF
NON-DEADLY FORCE

Subsequently, in Graham v. Connor, the United States
Supreme Court developed a standard to evaluate when force
used by police, while not deadly, was nevertheless excessive
given the circumstances surrounding a suspect's arrest. 31 In
Graham, police detained a diabetic whose suspicious behavior
was the result of an insulin reaction. 32 A police officer noticed
Graham and his companion quickly leave a convenience store
and then drive away.33 The officer followed by car, and decided

25
26

[d. at 11, 22.
[d. at 8 (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703) (internal quotes omit-

ted).
27
28

29

30
31
32

33

[d. at 1I.
[d.
[d. at 3.
[d. at 11.
Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
[d. at 388-389.
[d. at 389.
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to make an investigatory stop.34 In the midst of his insulin reaction, Graham exited the car, ran around it twice, sat down on
the curb, and briefly passed out. 35 A number of officers arrived,
handcuffed Graham, and among other things, shoved his face
into the hood of the car. 36 Graham suffered serious injuries resulting from the arrest, including a broken foot, cuts and
bruises, and a shoulder injury.37 Graham later filed suit in the
United States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina, alleging the officers used excessive force during his
arrest.3S The district court granted the defendants' motion for a
directed verdict. 39 A divided Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit affirmed. 40
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded,
concluding the district court erred in failing to analyze the excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard. 41 The Court once again applied the balancing
test used in Garner to determine whether the force used was
reasonable. 42 In addition, the Court held that in analyzing nondeadly force, the balancing test "requires careful attention to
the facts and circumstances of each particular case. 43 Factors
to consider included, but were not limited to: (1) the severity of
the crime, (2) whether the suspect posed an immediate threat
to safety, and (3) whether the suspect was resisting arrest or
attempting to flee. 44 In light of these factors, the Supreme
[d.
[d.
36 [d.
37 [d. at 390.
38 [d.
39 [d. at 391.
40 [d.
41 [d. at 399. Graham alleged the officers used excessive force in violation of his
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights. [d. at 390. The district court
applied a four-factor due process analysis including "(1) the need for the application of
force; (2) the relationship between that need and the amount of force that was used; (3)
the extent of the injury inflicted; and (4) whether the force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm." [d. (citing 644 F.Supp. 246, 248 (WDNC 1986)) (internal
quotes omitted). The Fourth Circuit majority agreed with the Due Process analysis.
[d. at 391. The Supreme Court, following its Garner decision, held that because the
force used to make an arrest is a seizure, the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard applies and thus, a substantive due process approach is inappropriate. [d. at 395.
42 [d. at 396.
43 [d.
44 [d.
34

35
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Court remanded to determine if Graham's arrest was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 45
Thus, in applying the balancing test to deadly and nondeadly force, two reasonableness standards emerge.46 When an
officer uses deadly force, the Garner standard applies, which is
appropriate only "if an officer has probable cause to believe
that a suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others. "47 On the other hand, if
non-deadly force is used, the less rigorous Graham standard
applies, and the Court must balance several relevant factors
when making the reasonableness determination. 48
THE DOG BITE CASES: APPLYING GARNER AND GRAHAM

C.

To appreciate the Ninth Circuit's application of existing
law in Miller, as well as this Note's critique of that application,
it is necessary to discuss briefly major Ninth Circuit cases involving police dogs. As the cases below indicate, the Ninth Circuit has consistently held that using a police dog does not constitute deadly force. 49 However, while the Ninth Circuit has
also consistently held that using a police dog does not constitute excessive force, the court has also made it clear that under
certain circumstances, an excessively long dog bite could constitute excessive force. 50

Police Dogs and Deadly Force - Vera Cruz v. City ofEscondido

1.

After consuming more than two six-packs of beer, Robert
Vera Cruz threatened employees at a local fast-food restaurant. 51 He left the restaurant but returned a short while later
with a knife strapped to his hip.52 The restaurant employees
called the police, and when Officer Eric Distel and his dog ar45
46
47
48

49

50

[d. at 399.
Miller, 340 F.3d at 962 n.3 (2003).
[d.
[d.
E.g. Brewer, 210 F.3d at 1098.
[d. at 964 (citing Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1093 (9th Cir.

1998).
51
52

Vera Cruz v. City of Escondido, 139 F.3d 659, 660 (9th Cir. 1997).
[d.
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rived, Vera Cruz was at the back of the restaurant throwing
objects out the back door.53 When he saw Officer Distel, Vera
Cruz attempted to flee.54 Officer Distel gave two warnings and
then released the dog, who bit Vera Cruz's right arm, bringing
him to the ground. 55 After disarming Vera Cruz, Officer Distel
ordered the dog to release. 56 As a result of the bite, Vera Cruz
suffered severe injuries to his right upper arm, requiring surgery and an eight-day hospital stay.57 Vera Cruz filed a lawsuit
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California alleging that the force used was both deadly and excessive, and his arrest was an unreasonable seizure in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. 58 The trial court found in favor of
the officer. 59 On appeal, Vera Cruz claimed the district erred in
refusing to instruct the jury on the Garner deadly force standard. 60
The Ninth Circuit recognized that Garner, the leading Supreme Court case involving deadly force, established when
deadly force is appropriate, but failed to define what constitutes deadly force. 61 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit, looking to
the Supreme Court's rationale in Garner, concluded that force
is deadly only when it presents "more than a remote possibility
of death."62 Otherwise, the court reasoned, "all uses of force
would be subject to Garner's deadly force requirements because
almost any use of force could cause death under peculiar
enough circumstances."63 Thus, because Vera Cruz failed to
offer evidence showing the existence of "more than a remote
possibility of death" from the dog, the Ninth Circuit held that
the force used was not deadly.54

sa Id.
54Id.
55Id.
56Id.
57 Id. at 660-66l.
68 Id. at 66l.
59Id.
60 Id.
61Id.
62 Id. at 663.
63Id.
MId.
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2.

Police Dogs and Excessive Force

a

Mendoza v. Block

[Vol. 34

After robbing a bank in Hacienda Heights, California,
Ronald Mendoza fled the scene by car and then on foot. 65 Sheriffs Deputies later found Mendoza's abandoned car, ran the
license plate, and discovered he had previously served time for
bank robbery.66 The deputies also received information warning that Mendoza may be armed. 67 After several hours, deputies finally located Mendoza hiding under some bushes on private property.68 Numerous warnings later, deputies released a
police dog, who quickly located Mendoza and dragged him out
of the bushes by his right arm.69
Mendoza continued struggling with the dog, and the dog bit his left side. 70 Once deputies
handcuffed Mendoza, they ordered the dog to release. 71 After
his arrest, Mendoza filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, claiming the
deputies used excessive force.72 The district court found in favor of the deputies, concluding that the deputies acted reasonably under the circumstances. 73
Mendoza was the first Ninth Circuit excessive force case
involving a police dog. 74 The court reasoned that a Fourth
Amendment analysis is applicable to "any arrest situation
where force is used, whether it involves physical restraint, use
of a baton, use of a gun, or use of a dog."75 Accordingly, using
dogs does not require a separate excessive-force analysis, thus,
excessive-force claims involving police dogs are properly analyzed under the Graham reasonableness standard. 76 However,
after applying the Graham factors in this case, the court held,
"[u]sing a police dog to find Mendoza, and to secure him until
Mendoza v. Block, 27 F.3d 1357, 1358 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id.
67Id.
68 Id.
69Id.
70 Id. at 1359.
71 Id.
72Id.
73Id.
74 Id. at 1361.
75 Id. at 1362.
76Id.

65

66
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he stopped struggling and was handcuffed, was objectively reasonable under these circumstances."77 Because Mendoza committed robbery, was likely armed, fled from police, and struggled with the officers, using a police dog under these circumstances was reasonable under Graham, and did not constitute
a Fourth Amendment violation. 7S
b.

Watkins v. City of Oakland

Officer Craig Chew and his dog, Nero, along with four
other officers, responded to a silent alarm at an Oakland auto
body shop located in a commercial warehouse. 79 The officers
saw the suspect inside the building, but they could not tell
whether he was armed. so Officer Chew gave two warnings before releasing the dog, who found Watkins hiding in a car, and
bit him.s1 When officers reached the defendant, they ordered
him to show his hands. s2 According to Chew, it took about
thirty seconds before Watkins complied with the officers' orders
but once he did, the dog was ordered to release the suspect.S3
Watkins suffered serious injuries to his right foot, including
fractures, lacerations and puncture wounds that subsequently
required two skin graft surgeries. 54
Watkins filed suit in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California, claiming that Officer Chew
used excessive force. s5 The district court denied the defendants'
request for summary judgment, holding that Watkins raised a
"genuine issue of material fact as to whether the force used
against [Watkins], including allowing Nero to continue biting
[him] until [he] showed his hands was reasonable under the

Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1362-1363.
79 Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 1998).
80 Id.
81Id.
82Id.
83 Id. Chew and another officer at the scene both stated that it took ten to fifteen
seconds for Watkins to comply with the officers' orders. Id. Later, in an interview with
Oakland Police Department Internal Affairs, Chew stated that it took about thirty
seconds before Watkins showed his hands. Id.
84 Id. at 1090-91.
85 Id. at 1090.
77

78
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circumstances. "86 The defendants appealed the district court's
order denying summary judgment.87
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because an
excessively long dog bite and improper encouragement by officers to prolong the bite could constitute excessive force, the district court properly denied defendants' summary judgment motion. 88 Thus, although the court did not ultimately determine
whether the force used here was excessive, it did make clear
that a prolonged dog bite, in this instance up to thirty seconds,
could constitute excessive force. 89
c.

Chew v. Gates

Thane Carl Chew (no relation to Officer Chew in Watkins
v. City of Oakland) ran and hid in a scrap yard after a police
officer pulled him over for a traffic violation. 90 The officer discovered Chew had three outstanding arrest warrants, and
called for backup.91 Officer Daniel Bunch and his dog, Volker,
were among those who arrived at the scene. 92 The officers did
not know whether Chew was armed. 93
Approximately two hours later, while out of the officers'
sight, Volker located Chew crouching between two metal bins,
and bit him several times before Officer Bunch found them. 94
Chew maintained that he repeatedly tried to surrender and
offered no resistance to the officers. 95 Officer Bunch, however,
stated that when he found Chew, the suspect was "hitting the
dog with a pipe."96 Bunch admitted to kicking Chew several
times, "possibly in the head, face or body," in an attempt to protect the dog. 97 Chew suffered severe lacerations to his left forearm and left side. 98
86
87

86

89

90
91
92
93

94
95
96
97

98

[d. (internal quotes omitted).
[d.
[d. at 1093.
[d.
Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1994).
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
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Chew filed a suit in the United States District Court for
the Central District of California against Officer Bunch, the
City of Los Angles, and Police Chief Daryl Gates, claiming the
attack violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.99 The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of all of the defendants except Officer Bunch. 100 At
trial, the jury returned a $13,000 general verdict against
Bunch. lol After trial, Chew appealed the district court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants. l02
On appeal, one of the main issues the Ninth Circuit addressed was whether the district court erred in finding "the Los
Angeles Police Department's policy governing the use of police
dogs to seize fleeing and hiding suspects" constitutional. 103
While the majority held that the district court had erred in
finding the policy constitutional, the judges did so for slightly
different reasons.104 Judge Reinhardt, writing for the majority,
took a Graham excessive-force approach, while Judge Norris
preferred a Garner deadly-force analysis. lOS
In assessing the gravity of the intrusion, Judge Reinhardt
concluded that the force used to apprehend Chew was severe. 10G
Volker bit Chew three times before achieving a solid hold, and
dragged him four to ten feet.l07 By Chew's account, the attack
nearly severed his arm.IOS Further, by allowing Volker to seize
a suspect out of officers' sight, Officer Bunch should have expected such a mauling to occur, because the dog was beyond
the reach of a countermanding order if and when the officers
located Chew. l09 In other words, because the attack occurred
Id. at 1435. Chew also alleged Fourteenth Amendment violations. Id.
Id.
101 Id. One ofthe many issues the court addressed was whether Chew was barred
from obtaining further damages because of the $13,000 jury verdict. Id. The Ninth
Circuit noted that from the record, it was unclear whether the judgment was compen·
sation for Chew's damages from the dog bite or from the assault by Officer Bunch. Id.
Because the record was unclear on this issue, the court concluded that the judgment
did not bar Chew from pursuing his claims for damages resulting specifically from the
dog bite. Id.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105Id.
106 Id. at 1441.
107Id.
lOB Id.
109 Id.
99

100
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outside of the officers' view, they were unable to intervene to
mitigate unnecessary injury.llo
Next, Judge Reinhardt applied the three Graham factors,
starting with whether Chew posed an immediate threat to the
safety of others.lll Here, Judge Reinhardt reasoned that because officers had no reason to believe Chew was armed, was
initially stopped for a traffic violation, did not engage in any
threatening activity after fleeing, and did nothing more than
"hide quietly," he did not pose an immediate threat to officer or
public safety.ll2 Thus, this factor weighed in favor of Chew. 1l3
Judge Reinhardt next addressed whether the suspect was
resisting arrest or attempting to flee. 1l4 Regarding whether the
suspect was "actively resisting arrest," Judge Reinhardt concluded that while the suspect did flee from police, he did not
physically resist the arresting officers, nor did the officers have
any reason to believe he would physically resist. 115 Regarding
whether the suspect was attempting to evade arrest by flight,
Judge Reinhardt noted the answer was "yes" and "no," reasoning that in the broad sense, he was, but more narrowly, his
flight ended once he was in the scrap yard. lls
Next, Judge Reinhardt addressed the severity of the
crime. ll7 He noted that Chew was stopped for a traffic violation. lls Although officers received information that Chew had
three prior outstanding felony warrants for his arrest, the officers did not know what the crimes of the three felony arrest
warrants were; thus, the information was of "limited" significance. 1l9 In addition, because Chew was trapped in a scrap
yard, surrounded by police, officers were not forced to make
split-second decisions. 120 Nonetheless, Judge Reinhardt felt
these two factors cut "slightly" in favor of the defendants. 121

[d.
[d.
112 [d. at 1442.
113 [d.
114 [d.
115 [d. (internal quotes omitted).
116 [d.
117 [d.
llS [d.
119 [d.
120 [d. at 1443.
121 [d.
llO

111
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Finally, Judge Reinhardt balanced the intrusion on Chew's
Fourth Amendment interests against the government's countervailing interests. 122 He concluded that while close, the most
important factor, whether Chew posed an immediate threat,
cut "strongly" in favor of Chew. 123 Therefore, because there was
a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the force
used was excessive, the court reversed the district court's partial summary judgment. 124
Judge Norris agreed with Judge Reinhardt that the district court erred in its partial summary judgment regarding the
policy department's policy using police dogs. 125 However, Judge
Norris argued that a deadly-force analysis was appropriate. 126
He reasoned that a dog, depending on how it is trained, qualifies as an instrument of deadly force.127 "[IJf the LAPD dogs, as
trained and deployed, constitute instruments of deadly force,
then the LAPD canine policy violates the Fourth Amendment
in exactly the same manner as did the Tennessee statute [in
Garner] because it fails to limit the application of deadly force
to those suspects who pose a significant threat to others."128
Therefore, because the issue of whether the LAPD dogs
amounted to instruments of deadly force was a genuine issue of
fact, the district court erred in its partial summary judgment. 129
Based on the above cases, notwithstanding Judge Norris'
concurring opinion in Chew, the Ninth Circuit has consistently
held that using police dogs does not constitute deadly force. 13o
Accordingly, the Graham excessive-force analysis, including
the three Graham factors, is the appropriate standard in assessing the reasonableness of using police dogs.l31 Further, using dogs can be unreasonable under certain conditions, such as
when a dog bites a suspect for an unusually long duration. 132

[d.
[d.
124 [d. at 1440.
125 [d. at 1435.
126 [d.
127 [d. at 1453.
128 [d. at 1454-55.
129 [d. at 1455.
130 Brewer, 210 F.3d at 1098. As recent as 2000, the Ninth Circuit held that using
police dogs does not constitute deadly force. [d.
131 Chew, 27 F.3d at 144l.
132 Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1093.
122

123
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MILLER V. CLARK COUNTY: THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND
THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS

On the night of January 21, 2001, a Clark County Sheriffs
Deputy on routine patrol became "suspicious" of a silver
Pontiac Fiero, and ran a computerized check on the license
plate. 133 The computer told the deputy that the plate belonged
to a different vehicle. 134 Because a switched license plate is a
traffic violation, and could indicate a stolen vehicle, the deputy
signaled the driver to pull over, but the driver refused. 135
At the foot of a long driveway, the driver slowed the car
and a passenger got out. 136 The deputy called for backup and
pursued the passenger, while the driver turned onto and proceeded up the driveway.137 Other deputies soon arrived, including Deputy Bylsma and his police dog, Kimon. 138 The deputies
walked up the long driveway and found the abandoned Fiero in
front of a house. 139 While searching the car, Deputy Bylsma
discovered a knife on the car seat.140 At some point, deputies
learned the driver's name was James Tracey Miller, that Miller
lived in the house with his parents, his family was not "law
enforcement friendly," and that a mentally ill person lived
there. 14l Deputies also learned that Miller was wanted for "attempting to flee from police by driving a car with a wanton or
willful disregard for the lives of others,» a felony in Washington
State. 142
Deputy Bylsma, his dog, Kimon, and another deputy
tracked Miller through the property's dark, densely wooded
terrain. 143 Bylsma shouted that he would release a police dog in
five seconds unless Miller surrendered. 144 When there was no
response, Bylsma released Kimon, and ordered the dog to find
133 Miller, 340 F.3d at 960. The facts of the case did not indicate if Miller had
stolen the Fiero.
134 [d.
135 [d.
136 [d.

137 [d.
138

[d.

139

[d.
[d. The knife was seven to eight inches in length. [d.
[d.
[d.

140
141
142
143
144

[d. 960-61.
[d. at 961.
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Miller and seize him using a "bite and hold" technique. "145 After about a minute, Deputy Bylsma heard Miller scream, and
immediately ran into the woods, locating Miller within fortyfive to sixty seconds. 146 After verifying Miller was unarmed,
Deputy Bylsma ordered Kimon to release. 147
Miller suffered extensive injuries during the attack, requiring surgery and several days in the hospital. 148 According
to Miller's hospital records, "[his] skin was torn in four places
above the elbow, and the muscles underneath were shredded.
[His] biceps muscle was 'balled up' in the antecupital [sic]
space. His brachialis muscle-the muscle closest to the bone
and alongside the brachialis artery-was torn. [His] injury
went as deep as the bone. "149 Miller continues to suffer from his
injuries. 15o
Miller brought suit against Deputy Bylsma and Clark
County in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington, alleging that using a police dog under
these circumstances violated his Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable seizures. 151 Miller alleged that using the
dog constituted excessive as well as deadly force. 152 Relying on
Vera Cruz's holding that using police dogs is not deadly force,
the district court granted the defendants partial summary
judgment on the deadly force issue. 153 After a bench trial, the
district court ruled in favor of both defendants on the excessive
force issue, holding that using the dog was not excessive force

145 [d. Kimon was ordered to seize Miller by biting his arm or leg. [d. The "bite
and hold" is a K-9 training technique in which the handling officer commands the dog
to locate and seize the suspect, usually by biting an arm or leg. RS. Eden, Handler
Control vs. Bark and Hold Apprehension Techniques (last visited September 18, 2003)
<http://www.policek9.com/htmVbitvsbk.html>. If the suspect remains calm, the dog
will exert only minimal pressure. [d. If, however, the suspect struggles, attempts to
flee, or threatens the safety of the dog or officers, the dog will bite more aggressively
until the suspect is subdued. [d. Only when the suspect is under control will the officers order the dog to release. [d.
146 Miller, 340 F.3d at 961.
147 [d.
148 [d.
149 [d.
150 [d.
151 [d.
152 [d.
153 [d. at 961-962.
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under the circumstances. 154 Miller appealed the district court's
ruling. 155
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit examined whether the force
used was either deadly or excessive 156 Specifically, the court
looked at whether "ordering a trained police dog to 'bite and
hold' the suspect until officers arrived on the scene less than a
minute later" violated the suspect's Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable seizures. 157 The court first disposed of the
deadly force allegation. 158 While citing the Ninth Circuit's rule
that using a police dog does not generally constitute deadly
force, the court recognized that they had never considered the
deadly force issue in the context of a dog bite lasting almost a
minute. 159 The court considered the testimony of Dr. Craig
Eddy, Miller's medical expert, who stated in an affidavit that a
dog with Kimon's biting force could lacerate arteries in the
arms or legs resulting in the suspect bleeding to death. l60 Further, if the dog punctured a critical artery in the arm or leg, the
suspect could bleed to death within a few minutes. 161 Dr. Eddy
testified that in his opinion, a prolonged dog bite to the extremities without immediate restraint constitutes the use of
deadly force, and that "the force and location of the dog bite
wounds [here] had a reasonable probability of causing Mr.
Miller's death."162
The court also considered Deputy Bylsma's testimony, who
admitted that it was "possible" Kimon could bite a suspect's
head or neck if more readily available than an arm or leg, and
such a bite, arguably, would more likely result in death. l63
Deputy Bylsma also admitted that a suspect's injuries are
likely to be more severe the longer a dog is allowed to bite. l64
Notwithstanding these considerations, the court found the risk
[d.
[d.
156 [d.
157 [d.
158 [d.
159 [d.
160 [d.
lSI [d.
IS2 [d.
154

at 961.

155

at 961, 963.
at 960.
at 961-962.
at 962.

at 963 D.7. An extremity is an arm or a leg. An arm is often referred to as
an upper extremity and a leg as a lower extremity. MOSBY'S POCKET DICTIONARY
OF MEDICINE, NURSING, & ALLIED HEALTH 441.
163 Miller, 340 F.3d at 962.
164 [d. at 963.
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of death from Miller's injuries remote, holding that "the possibility that a properly trained police dog could kill a suspect under aberrant circumstances does not convert otherwise nondeadly force into deadly force."165 Relying on Vera Cruz's holding that deadly force is force that presents "more than a remote
possibility" of death under the circumstances in which it is
used, the court concluded Miller presented no evidence that he
was subjected to more than a remote possibility of death. 166
Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's partial summary
judgment on the deadly force issue. 167
The court next addressed the excessive force issue. 16B Here,
the court reiterated Graham's balancing test, in which the reasonableness of a seizure is determined by balancing "the nature
and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth
Amendment interests against the countervailing government
interests at stake."169 In assessing the gravity of the intrusion
on Miller's Fourth Amendment interests, the court agreed with
the district court that the force used to seize Miller was "considerable," and "exacerbated" by the bite duration, concluding,
the intrusion was a "serious" one.l70 Therefore, because there
was a significant intrusion on Miller's Fourth Amendment interests, the second prong of the balancing test needed to outweigh this intrusion in order for the government to prevail. l71
To assess the countervailing "government interests" prong
of the balancing test, the court applied the three Graham factors.172 First, because police wanted Miller on a prior felony
charge as well as the misdemeanor infraction, officers had a
legitimate government interest in apprehending Miller.173 Second, the court held Miller posed an "immediate threat" to officer safety, as well as to others.174 On this point, the court relied
heavily on the fact that officers found a knife lying on the seat
of Miller's car.l75 The court felt this fact indicated a "propensity
[d.
[d.
167 [d.
1GB [d.
169 [d.
170 [d.
171 [d.
172 [d.
173 [d.
174 [d.
175 [d.
165

166

at 963 (italics added).
at 962-63 (citing to Vera Cruz, 139 F.3d at 663) (internal quotes omitted).
at 963.
at 964 (citing to Graham, 49 U.S. at 396) (internal quotes omitted).
(internal quotes omitted).

at 965.
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to carry a weapon (and perhaps a weapon more lethal than the
one he had left behind)."176 In addition, because the wooded
terrain was familiar to Miller and unfamiliar to the deputies,
Miller could stage an ambush, giving him a "strategic advantage."l77 Therefore, the court concluded that Miller posed a serious and immediate threat to officers.17S Third, since Miller
fled the scene and hid from deputies, the court found that
Miller was actively evading his arrest by flight. 179 Thus, the
court found that the three factors weighed in favor of the
state. 1SO
Finally, the court balanced the intrusion on Miller's Fourth
Amendment rights against the countervailing government interests in apprehending Miller to determine whether the force
used by the deputy was reasonable under the circumstances. 1Sl
, Here, the court reasoned that deputies had attempted to apprehend Miller first with less forceful means. 1S2 According to
the court, these attempts included signaling Miller to pull over,
pursuing Miller by car, pursuing Miller by foot, and audibly
warning Miller before releasing the police dog. l83 Therefore,
considering all the circumstances surrounding the arrest, including the three Graham factors, the court held that using a
police dog to apprehend a fleeing felon, hiding in dark and unfamiliar woods, who was possibly armed, and in a position to
ambush deputies, was a reasonable seizure that did not violate
Miller's fourth Amendment rights. 1M
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT FAILED To PROPERLY APPLY THE
GRAHAM BALANCING TEST IN MILLER

Applying the Graham balancing test to determine whether
the deputies used reasonable force to seize Miller requires a
careful analysis of the facts and circumstances of his particular

176

177
178

179
180
181
182
183

184

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 965-966.
[d. at 964-966.
[d. at 966.
[d.

[d.
[d. at 966,968.
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situation. ls5 While the court recognized that the force used to
apprehend Miller was "serious," the court failed to appropriately weigh the seriousness of that intrusion against the government's interest in apprehending Miller. ls6 Here, the seriousness of the intrusion on Miller's Fourth Amendment rights
far outweighs the government's interest in apprehending him,
and careful analysis of the facts requires the court to find the
force used as excessive.
A.

THE INTRUSION ON MILLER'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
WAS SERIOUS

In evaluating the gravity of the intrusion upon Miller's
Fourth Amendment interests, two factors weigh heavily in
Miller's favor: First, the length of the attack and second, that
the attack occurred outside the deputies' presence. lS7 Regarding
the length of the attack, it is significant that the length of the
dog attack was excessively long (forty-five to sixty seconds).lss
In fact, Miller received a longer dog bite than in any of the previously decided dog bite cases. lS9 For example, in Watkins, the
suspect received a bite lasting up to thirty seconds, which the
court found could be excessive. 190 Given the severe damage that
such dog bites can inflict, common police practice attempts to
limit the bite to just a few seconds. 19l
More important, Miller's bite occurred outside the view
and supervision of the deputies. 192 Prior cases have emphasized
that police are less able to control a dog attack when it occurs
outside their view, and that a prolonged, unsupervised attack
is more likely to cause serious injuries. 193 For example, in
Chew, the dog attacked the suspect, biting him three times before achieving an effective hold, and then dragged him between
four and ten feet from his concealed location. 194 The attack

187

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
Miller, 340 F.3d at 964.
[d. at 961.

188

[d.

185

186

189 [d. at 962.
191

Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1090, 1093.
See Miller, 340 F.3d at 961.

192

[d.

190

193 See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441. See also Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1090. See also Mendoza, 27 F.3d at1359.
194 See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441.
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occurred outside the officers' view, exacerbating Chew's injuries. 195 Likewise, in Watkins, the suspect also suffered severe
injuries resulting from an attack outside the officers' control
and supervision. 196 On the other hand, in Mendoza, even
though the suspect struggled with the dog, because the officers
were present during the entire attack, Mendoza apparently
suffered only minor injuries. 197 Miller, however, was not within
the deputies' sight during most of the attack, and deputies
were too far away to intervene as the situation escalated. 198 As
a result, Miller, like the suspects in Chew and Watkins, sustained serious injuries resulting from the prolonged, unsupervised attack.
In addition, if Kimon had accidentally punctured an artery, as Deputy Bylsma himself testified was a possibility,
Miller would likely have bled to death before officers could
reach him in time. 199 In fact, the only reason the deputies found
Miller when they did was that he screamed and continued
screaming until they found him.200 If Miller had passed out, he
likely would have bled to death even without the dog puncturing an artery.20l As the Ninth Circuit pointed out, Miller was
hiding in dark woods, which were unfamiliar to the deputies. 202
Yet, the court only found these facts persuasive in assessing
the reasonableness of the deputies' actions, and chose to ignore
these same facts when assessing the gravity of the Fourth
Amendment intrusion. 203 If they had, they might have concluded the intrusion was more serious, given that Miller could
have died because of the dark, unsupervised conditions.
The cases suggest that during a supervised attack, the officer can·act quickly, resulting in a shorter bite and thus, a more
"reasonable" intrusion into the suspect's Fourth Amendment

195

[d.

See Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1090.
See Mendoza, 27 F.3d at 1359. The court failed to mention the extent of Mendoza's injuries, but they were probably relatively minor since the court did not indicate
otherwise. Id.
198 Miller, 340 F.3d at 96l.
199 Miller, 340 F.3d at 962.
200 [d. at 96l.
201 [d. at 963.
202 [d. at 964, 966.
203 [d. at 966.
196

197
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rights. 204 However, when the dog attack is unsupervised, a prolonged bite is more likely to occur, resulting in injuries that are
significantly more serious. 205 Because of the significantly increased risk of harm to the suspect during an unsupervised
attack, this factor should get more weight when balancing the
intrusion onto a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights. Here,
however, the court failed to consider the unsupervised nature
of the attack in its analysis.

B.

THE GOVERNMENT'S INTEREST IN APPREHENDING MILLER
DID NOT OUTWEIGH THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT INTRUSION

The second Graham prong requires an assessment of the
countervailing government interests at stake. 206 Again, in determining the importance of the government interests, courts
have traditionally looked to (1) the severity of the crime, (2) the
threat posed by the suspect, and (3) whether the suspect actively resisted arrest. 207 Since the third factor here is undisputed, this Note focuses on the court's application of the first
and second factors.

1.

Severity of the Crime

The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that Miller had allegedly
committed a misdemeanor traffic violation (mismatched license
plates), however, what elevated the severity level in the court's
analysis was his outstanding felony warrant. 20B The court
failed, however, to examine the particulars of the felony: Attempting to flee police by driving with wanton and willful disregard of others, in essence, reckless driving. In Chew, although the suspect's prior felony warrants were apparently in
connection to prior burglaries, this information was not part of
the district court's record, and was unknown to Officer Bunch
at the time of the arrest. 209 However, the Ninth Circuit rea204 See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441. See also Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1090. See also Men·
doza, 27 F.3d at 1359.
205 See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1441.
206 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
207

[d.

208

Miller, 340 F.3d at 964.
Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443 n.9.

209
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soned that even if this information was part of the record, its
inclusion would make no difference in the court's analysis. 210
Burglary, the court noted, rarely involves physical violence.211
In other words, the mere fact that a suspect is wanted for a
felony does not automatically mean that the suspect poses an
immediate threat to officer or to public safety.212 The nature of
the felony must be considered. 213 In addition, the court also
reasoned that the significance of Chew's warrants was further
diminished because he was completely surrounded by police
with little chance of escape. 214 While Miller allegedly committed a crime that certainly threatened the lives of others, reckless driving does not seem as menacing as burglary, and in
Chew, the court found that crime insignificant in their dangerousness analysis. 215 Further, Miller was for the most part surrounded by deputies and his chances of escape were slim. 216
In addition, this was not a situation where deputies were
forced to make split-second decisions. For example, in Chew,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that because officers had confined
the suspect to the large scrap yard, officers had ample time to
deliberate and consult with their superiors before taking action, and thus, were not required to make split-second decisions.217 Likewise, in Miller, deputies had confined Miller to
the woods.218 Although hiding in the woods was perhaps not as
confined as hiding in a scrap yard, deputies arguably had the
upper hand. They had control over Miller's home and vehicle,
and knew the general location of where he was hiding. 219 The
deputies had ample time to gather information and design a
course of action. If nothing else, deputies merely had to wait
until Miller came out of the woods. Further, even when police
are forced to make split-second decisions based on the facts and
circumstances confronting them in a particular situation, they

210

211

[d.
[d.

[d. (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 1706).
See id. at 1442.
214 Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443.
215 Miller, 340 F.3d at 960. Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443 n.9.
216 See Miller, 340 F.3d at 960-61.
217 Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443.
218 Miller, 340 F.3d at 960-61.
212
213

219

[d.
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must still refrain from using force beyond that which is reasonable under the circumstances. 22o

2.

Immediate Threat to the Safety ofO{ficers and Others

Here again, the court relied heavily on Miller's outstanding felony reckless driving warrant to conclude Miller
posed an immediate threat to public safety.221 However,
Miller's dangerousness toward the public stemmed from driving, and Miller was hiding in the woods, while deputies had
complete control over his vehicle. 222 It seems unlikely that once
Miller was separated from his vehicle, he continued to pose a
significant threat to others. Moreover, Miller hid in the woods
alone, hardly a threat to the public. In short, Miller did not
pose a significant threat to others. The Ninth Circuit, however,
failed to address these issues.
The court also relied heavily on the fact that deputies
found a knife on the seat of Miller's abandoned car, concluding
that Miller was currently armed and posed an immediate danger to the deputies. 223 However, it is arguably just as reasonable that he left the only weapon he had behind, or that the
weapon belonged to his passenger, or, perhaps, it was no
weapon at all but merely a knife. Although the deputies believed that there was a "chance" Miller was not "law enforcement friendly," and possibly had mental problems, the deputies
had no information that indicated Miller was specifically violent. 224
In addition, the court inferred that Miller, a supposed
mentally ill individual, was some sort of grand strategist. 225
The court reasoned that because Miller was familiar with the
woods, if his "defiant and evasive tendencies turned violent," he
could "ambush" the deputies. 226 While Miller was familiar with
the woods outside his home, it seems unlikely that he held such
a distinct advantage over the deputies. 227 There simply was not
See Chew, 27 F.3d at 1443.
Miller, 340 F.3d at 965.
222 [d. at 960.
223 [d. at 965.
224 [d. at 960.
225 [d. at 965.
226 [d.
227 [d.
220

221
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enough information known to the deputies when they arrived
at the scene to suggest Miller posed such a threat. Moreover, if
the deputies truly believed Miller posed such a threat, they
could have waited until he emerged from his hiding place, and
safely arrested him then, without jeopardizing officer safety.
Again, because Miller, presumably hiding alone in the woods,
posed no threat to public safety, it simply was not necessary
under these circumstances to send deputies into a potentially
dangerous situation to capture him.228
In short, because Miller had not committed violent offenses, posed no immediate threat to public safety, and deputies had ample time to consider options other than potentially
endangering their own safety, these two Graham factors
weighed in favor of Miller. Therefore, in balancing the serious
intrusion on Miller's Fourth Amendment rights against the
countervailing government interest in apprehending Miller, the
scale tips in favor of Miller. Thus, using a police dog to seize
Miller, under these circumstances was excessive force.
IV. CONCLUSION

There is a point when even constitutionally permitted force
becomes excessive. 229 The Ninth Circuit agrees that while using a police dog to effect an arrest is generally permissible, a
prolonged dog bite could constitute excessive force under certain circumstances. 23o To determine the reasonableness of the
force used requires careful attention to the particular facts of
each case. 231 The bite Miller received far outlasted those in all
other leading cases. 232 Yet the facts indicate Miller posed less
threat than the plaintiffs in those leading cases did. Thus,
when balancing the gravity of the intrusion on Miller's Fourth
Amendment rights (a bite lasting forty-five to sixty seconds)
against the government's countervailing interests (the need to
apprehend Miller), using a police dog under these circum-

Id. at 960-961.
229 See Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1093.
230 Miller, 340 F.3d at 964 (citing to Watkins, 145 F.3d at 1093).
231 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
232 Miller, 340 F.3d at 962.
228
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stances constituted excessive force in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 233
LISA K. SLOMAN'
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